Pre-market regulation of the introduction of new medical products is widely seen as offerinc the important beneEit of protecting the public from the hazards of potentially unsafe drugs and devices (Mitchell and Link, 1976) .
At the same time, many believe these regulations unduly delay or prevent the availability of new products by imposing added costs on the process of technical innovation (Mitchell and Link, 1976; Wardell, 1979) . Much of the interest in the latter issue stems from response to the legislative changes enacted in 1962 by the U.S. Congress that gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to impose safety and efficacy criteria on new commercial pharmaceutical product review prior to market introduction. A general decline in U.S. drug research and development in the ten years that followed has been described as a "biological knowledge gap" and attributed by some, but not all, to the costs of compliance with the newly-imposed regulations (Wardell, 1979; Pelzman, 1973) .
By the recent enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Congress extended the mandate of the FDA to require additional scrutiny of non-pharmaceutical commercial products with clinical applications (P.L. 94-295). Uncertainties about how new laws will be implemented continue to complicate the estimation of the magnitude any added costs to be incurred by would-be manufacturers of new device and diagnostic products. Hence, it is unlikely that either these costs, or the countervailing benefits of the regulations can easily be quantified or compared.
Instead we have adopted an historical approach in order to consider the likely effects of safety and efficacy regulation on the process of technological innovation in medical devices. Previously reported work has addressed the stages of the innovation process that precede commercialization and has empirically documented the significance of both commercial and non-commercial sources in the generation of new products (von Hippel,,1976 (von Hippel,, , 1977 (von Hippel,, , 1979 von Hippel and Finkelstein, 1979; Comroe and Dripps, 1976) . The predominance of one source relative to the other has relevance for the impact of regulation on medical device innovation because the regulations promulgated are designed to have a direct effect on the commercial manufacturers of medical devices only.
In this paper, we first describe the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.
Next, we provide empirical evidence on the sources of a subset of the innovations regulated by the Amendments clinical chemistry diagnostic products andf finally, we discuss the likely effect of the Amendments given the pattern of the innovation found.
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
The Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act became law in 1976. These amendments assigned broad authority to the food and drug administration to establish procedures and safeguards governing the introduction and usage of a broad class of products called "Medical Devices."* Compliance with the regulations is principally demanded of commercial manufacturers intent on introducing new products and only secondarily concerned with modifications to products and procedures occuring outside the manufacturers control.
The device amendments authorize the FDA to classify all devices into one of three categories. These categories reflect the risks associated with the degree of critical application of the device. Class 1 devices would be the least stringently regulated, subject to "general controls" including the registration by each manufacturer of those production facilities manufacturing * It would be inaccurate to state that prior to the 1976 laws, medical devices were absolutely free of regulation. Some diagnostic technologies, for example, made use of antibiotic drugs and were considered drugs for regulatory purposes. Diagnostics derived from animal or human blood called biologicals would have been regulated under specific authority for this category of substances. In addition, hospitals or other locations undertaking human testing of new devices would cost likely have been subject to review by that institutions committee that monitors research on human subjects. specific devices. Manufacturers of class 1 devices are required to comply with "good manufacturing practices" (GMPs) and also required to establish staffs responsible for compliance with the GMPs. Inspections of manufacturing facilities to verify manufacturer compliances are mandated for class 1 devices. Class 2 devices are those for which the general controls described above were seen to present insufficient safety assurance. Specific standards of performance for each device classified in this category were to be agreed on by members appointed to advisory panels of the Bureau of Devices in the FDA.
Devices categorized in class 3 require pre-market approval to be granted on the basis of studies of the safety and efficacy of the device. Upon the granting of pre-market approval, class 3 devices are reclassified into one of the less stringent risk categories (class 2 or class 1).
All products which were on the market at the same time of enactment of the amendments were to be considered tentatively classified in class 1, pending the establishment of standards for products that were seen to belong in class 2. Products introduced after the enactment date but shown to be substantially equivalent to products already on the m4rket at the time of enactment may be marketed according to regulations for equivalent products if this equivalency can be satisfactorily documented. However, post enactment devices bearing no equivalence relationship to products currently on the market will automatically fall into class 3. Pre-market approval is required for any manufacturer introducing a device for the first time whether or not another manufacturer is already marketing a similar product. Significant changes in design or modifications in the use of device also necessitate premarket review.
Because a number of critical regulations have yet to be promulgated, the Medical Device Amendments present considerable uncertainty to affected manufacturers. Some estimates are that it will be at least two more years before the various panels commissioned by the FDA complete their respective classification activities. The regulations as implemented will offer an opportunity for challenging a classification or the denial by the FDA of "substantially equivalent" status. Also permitted will be "investigational device exemptions" which would permit product testing by a supervised clinical investigator. However many of the procedures for challenges and exemptions have yet to be promulgated.
With uncertainty about the magnitude of any increases in costs or development time for new products comes special concern for small firms for whom lengthened development time might present a cash drain to organizations that would already be expected to be hard pressed for working capital. In an effort to assist small manufacturers, the FDA has established an office of Small Manufacturer Assistance. It has placed medical device coordinators at regional FDA offices and offers publications, workshops, and assorted advisory materials.
While these efforts may help the small manufacturer understand how to comply with the regulations, they do not at all diminish his responsibility for compliance.
Direct costs of compliance with regulation would seem to be dependent on whether a particular device or diagnostic is assigned to class 1, 2, or 3 (Glennie and Dworkin, 1975) . One description of current devices that has been reported by the FDA has about one-third classified as "general controls"
(class 1) and nearly one-half as "performance standards," (class 2, leaving some 17% as potentially requiring pre-market approval (class 3). The percent of diagnostics, the device category that we will explore at length, requiring pre-market clearance by the FDA would be expected to be even lower. And some argue that reputable manufacturers would incur the costs -5-of generating clinical product-evaluation data on most of these products in the absence of any federal requirement.
It has also been argued that the high pportunity costs of developing new devices or diagnostics that require pre-market approval might be high enough that firms conducting research and development might shift their focus to concentrate on developing less critical products or making improvements to current products. Some have predicted a general decline in research activity while others have stated their belief that the growth rate in the device area in recent years has been so great and financial incentives so strong that if a decline in research output does occur, that it will not be large.
If safety and efficacy regulation makes it more difficult to introduce unsafe and unworthy new clinical products to market, then it might also be more difficult and more costly to introduce ones that are safe and effective. How much protection from potential hazard is worth trading for how much new product innovation is a judgment call that will not be settled without lengthy debate. We will later argue that only if the historical pattern of innovation in the clinical chemistry diagnostic products area strongly favors a private sector locus to the essential exclusion of public sector sources will the impact of the new regulations on chemistry innovation be as destructive as the pessimists predict. 2) A great deal of product innovation has takeni place in the category in the last 20 years.
In this section we will present empirical data regarding the patterns of innovation found in clinical chemistry tests. We will begin by briefly characterizing such tests for readers unfamiliar with them. We will then describe the two samples of test-related innovations we have studied; describe how data regarding these was collected; and then, finally present the innovation patterns observed. Typically, the first version of a new chemical test method to be developed is a 'manual' one -a protocol which may be executed by a clinical chemist using standard laboratory techniques and equipment. Later, some of these manual methods are adapted for use on automated equipment. We decided to examine patterns of innovation in both of these tasks. Qqr sample of manually performed clinical chemistry tests were selected tQ be. the manual test protocols which were the antecedents to the sample of autQpated tests described above, (Study of each of the automated protocols sampled showed that all were based on manual protocols described earlier. were left with a sample of 24 cases of the innovation task "development of a manually-performed clinical chemistry test method which was later adapted for automation."
Data regarding the patterns of innovative activity associated with our innovation sample was collected by, first, conducting a search of the medical literature* for publications related to each innovation being examined. We then contacted authors whose work was regarded by us -or cited in other papers as -importantly contributing to each innovation. Those contacted were given semi-structured interviews regarding their knowledge of innovation pattern issues of interest to us. In the course of these interviews, interviewees were asked for the names of other individuals with user, manufacturer, or other relationships to the innovation who might have a good knowledge of these matters discussed. Individuals so identified were contacted in turn, and the process continued by iteration until we felt a point of dimihishing returns had been reached.
In a second and independent data collection effort, manufacturer personnel involved in commercializing automated chemistry innovations who might not have published or have been known to those who had published were contacted * During our literature searches, two data sources were found to be especially useful. The MEDLINE computerized index of the medical literature and "Product Labeling"--U.S. Food and Drug Administration terminology for methods-related information which the suppliers of clinical test chemistry methods make available to their customers. We acquired product labeling from both Technicon and Dupont for all tests and methods in our sample. These contained references to publications on chemical test methods used and, in the case of Technicon labeling, also contained references to publication reporting innovations in basic chemical methods as well as adaption of methods to automation and the results.
-9-and interviewed. We felt such individuals could potentially have useful additional data and a very different point of view regarding the innovation patterns leading to the innovations being studied.
For the purposes of the present paper, the main finding of interest to us, developed from the approach described above, is that both commercial and non-commercial sources of innovation were indeed found present in our innovation samples. These are shown in Figure 1 . Note from the data pre- This means that a researcher interested in adapting a novel test to the equipment can connect up the analyzer modules in a novel configuration and/or insert novel reagents in the equipments supply reservoirs. In contrast, the DuPont aca is not modular and utilizes reagent contained in factory sealed "test packs" which cannot be conveniently modified by interested researchers. (b) Coded 'manufacturer' if method developer(s) determined to be employed by a manufacturer of clinical chemistry analyzer equipment and/or manufacturer of reagents used in these while doing the method development work.
(c) The coding 'method developer' was assigned to the first to publish a report of the method and clinical data regarding its validity.
('Publication' the case of manufacturers, could be either journal publication or the date of first marketing of the method (usually in the form of reagent 'kits' for manual or machine applications). Test methods are not marketed until supporting clinical data is available).
(d) The SMAC is the latest of several models of Technicon Analyzers utilizing the principle of "continuous flow analysis". Some of the methods offered by Technicon to SMAC users were adapted to continuous flow on the SMAC, others were adapted on other models of continuous flow analyzers and found appropriate for use an SMAC as well. This is because the sources of innovation could very well have been different in medical device innovation than in drug innovation. Below, we consider the significance of the sources of innovation we found in clinical chemistry test methods.
In the concrete instance of clinical chemistry diagnostic products,
we have shown that researchers and practitioners working in non-profit institutions dominated the origins of the tests in our sample although laboratories of commercial manufacturers originated some new manuallyexecuted clinical chemistry tests and adapted more of these to automated equipment. With respect to modifications, we typically found that when a manual chemistry test method was developed by a manufacturer, the adaptation to instrumentation was also undertaken by that same manufacturer.
On the other hand, when a manual chemistry test method was developed by a user, it was adapted to automation by the same or another user or alternatively in a manufacturer's laboratory. In sum, then, our findings lead us to suspect that the negative impact of the Medical Device Amendments on research into innovative clinical chemistry tests will be moderated by the lack of impact of these regulations on the source of most such innovations -researchers and practitioners working in non-profit institutions. But what about the impact of the regulation on dissemination of such innovations? Our research. did not address the patterns of dissemination of clinical chemistry innovations, However, we suspect that manufacturers play a major role in diffusion and that only a relatively few sophisticated labs implement an innovative test on the basis of reports in the literature, Thus, we may suspect that the Medical Device Amendments will have a much more significant impact on diffusion than on research -at least in the short run. In the longer run, it is interesting to speculate whether non-commercial diffusion might increase as a response on the part of users to increased delays in delivery of the latest technology through commercial channels due to the new regulations. If so, this would affect the commercial fate of different brands of analyzers. Those capable of using user-prepared reagents would fare best, and could also have the effect of circumventing a principal intent of the Medical Device Amendment, preventing consumer access Ill to unapproved "Medical Devices". Whether such a prospect is to be feared or welcomed will depend on each reader's view of the likely cost versus benefit of the regulation introduced with the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. We suggest only that studies of the sources of innovation such as that performed here can potentially allow readers to raise specific questions regarding the likely impact of proposed new regulations on innovation at the time the regulations are being designed.
